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Abstract—Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technol-
ogy for automatic object identification that has been implemented
in several real-life applications. In this work, we expand a novel
relevant application of RFID tags for grocery stores, which aims
to check the adequacy of food items with respect to the shoppers’
personal preferences. Unlike similar works, we focus on shoppers’
privacy and running time efficiency. For this aim, we propose
a novel private set intersection (PSI) protocol to be used in
matching the shoppers’ personal preferences with the set of each
item’s adequate profiles that are held by the back-end server of
the store. We provide a standard security proof against curious
stores and malicious customers. For efficiency concern, we build
our protocol without cryptographic operations, and we achieve
a linear asymptotic complexity of O(v + c) for communications
and store-side computations, where v and c are the numbers
of profiles in the store’s back-end server and the shopper’s list
of preferences respectively. Moreover, experimental results and
comparisons with state-of-the art solutions reveal the scalability
of our novel PSI protocol for big market stores.
Index Terms—Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Profile
Matching, Private Set Intersection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless tech-
nology that uses radio waves to identify and track objects.
RFID systems consist of tags attached to the objects to be
identified and readers that communicate with the tags to collect
information. Owing to its advantages over barcode systems,
RFID market is gaining increasing values that are expected to
exceed US$18 billion by 2026 [1]. This rapid proliferation has
allowed a wide range of endless applications, where commerce
comes in first. For instance, Large-scale supermarkets like
Walmart are attaching RFID tags to their goods to increase
business revenue lost by theft or inaccurate accounting of
goods [2]. Amazon Inc. has launched Amazon Go, a high-
tech retail store currently in a private beta testing in Seattle,
and filled a patent [3] in which they use RFID to detect when
a shopper takes an item from the shelf. Then, the system
adds up the item and charges the shopper’s Amazon account
without requiring going through a traditional check-out line.
This, should improve shopping experience for customers with
easier item returns.
Following this technology adoption, we introduce a novel
relevant RFID-based application that we coin as FAC: Food
Adequacy Check, which provides customers with information
on food items whether they match their preferences or not.
For instance, customers suffering from diabetes or needing a
gluten-free diet, should have a detailed insight about items
before buying them. Traditionally, a shopper can easily make
such a check relying on product labels; nevertheless, matching
a complex profile that involves several information such as
age, weight, several diseases, and follows a special program
as Low Carb diet [4], is a tedious task. This is highly true,
if the shopper wants to match several preferences including
his/her one and those of his/her family.
Accordingly, we propose (Π-FAC), a novel private and effi-
cient set intersection protocol that we use to match customers
personal preferences with items adequate profiles. We design
(Π-FAC) as a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that is
implemented on customers’ smartphones and the supermarket
back-end server. We use passive RFID tags with no computa-
tional capability, which is the cheapest type of tag, to allow
the deployment of our application with affordable cost.
We address the privacy concern of the shopper preferences
against curious server, besides the privacy of the database
of item profiles held by the back-end server against mali-
cious shoppers as this may be a paid service. We provide a
simulation-based security proof under the standard real/ideal
paradigm [5].
For the efficiency concern, we build our protocol upon
efficient matrix algebra without cryptographic operations to
ensure its scalability for large supermarkets. We achieve a
linear asymptotic complexity of O(v + c) in communications
and server side computations, where v and c are, respectively,
number of profiles within the server database and the customer
list of preferences. Finally, we make experimental evaluations
to confirm the efficiency of our (Π-FAC) protocol compared
to the hash-based private set intersection solution used in
practice.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we review recent literature works in Private Set Intersection
field and we discuss them. In Section III, we introduce a
novel RFID-based application that we name Food Adequacy
Check (FAC). Then, in Section IV, we detail our novel private
set intersection protocol used within FAC application for the
private profile matching purpose. Next, we provide a standard
security analysis of our protocol, in Section V, using the
Real/Ideal paradigm. After that, we devote Section VI to
evaluate the efficiency of our protocol compared to the hash-
based solution used in practice. Finally, we conclude this work
by summarizing our contribution.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a literature survey on the private
set intersection (PSI) functionality that we use to implement
the Food Adequacy Check application. We focus on PSI
protocols that work in the standard (plain) model, where
security is only based on complexity assumptions.
Assume a client (C) and a server (V ) having private
sets of profiles X and Y of sizes c and v respectively.
Two main approaches were used to solve PSI(X,Y), namely
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) [8] and Oblivious
Pseudo-Random Functions (OPRF) evaluation [9].
1) OPE based-PSI: In this approach, C defines a poly-
nomial P (.) such that P (x) = 0 for each x ∈ X , and
sends to V homomorphic encryptions of the coefficients of
P (.). Then, V computes the encryption of (r.P (y) + y) for
each y ∈ Y , using homomorphic properties of the encryption
system and a fresh random r. Finally, C decrypts the received
cyphertexts and gets either elements of the intersection (if
plaintexts match an element of X) or random values. In this
approach, we find works of Freedman et al. [10], Kissner and
Song [11], Dachman-Soled et al. [14] and Hazay [15]. They
targeted semi-honest and malicious settings, where the most
efficient construction [15] incurs O(v+c) communications and
O(c + v log log c) computations, under the strong Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption (strong-DDH).
2) OPRF-based PSI: In which V defines a random key (k)
for a pseudo random function (PRF) fk(.) and computes the
set fky = {fk(y) : y ∈ Y }. Then, V and C executes an OPRF
protocol where V inputs fk(.) and C inputs the set X and gets
the set fkx = {fk(x) : x ∈ X}. At the end, V sends the set
fky to C that evaluates fkx ∩ fky . This approach was used
by Hazay and Lindell [16], Jarecki and Liu [17], Hazay and
Nissim [19] and Hazay [15] to propose PSI protocols secure
in the semi-honest and malicious settings. The most efficient
protocol that does not require non standard assumptions [15]
costs O(v+c) computations under the strong-DDH assumption
and O((v + c) log (v + c)) under the DDH assumption.
Contrary to existing PSI protocols that rely on cryptographic
schemes, we propose a novel PSI protocol based on efficient
matrix algebra and secure under the mixed model of adver-
saries. Our protocol incurs O(v + c) communications and
server computations while maintaining fairness.
III. FAC: A NOVEL RFID-BASED FOOD ADEQUACY
CHECK SYSTEM
In this section, we present a novel RFID-application that
aims to check the adequacy of foods to shoppers’ personal
preferences.
A. FAC Overview
To illustrate the FAC application, we consider a supermarket
that tagged its items with RFID tags, and provides shopping
carts with embedded RFID reader devices for its clients. Each
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Tagged 
Items 
RFID   
Reader 
RFID   
Middleware 
Wireless Communication Gateway 
Smart 
Phones 
Backend   
Server 
Other RFID 
Applications 
Application 
Communication 
RFID System 
Smart 
Phones 
Personal 
Profiles 
(Π-SI)    
Private     
Set 
Intersection  
Backend      
Server 
All Item 
Profiles 
Figure 1. Architecture & Infrastructure requirements for FAC application
client will be provided a mobile application that he/she sets up
on his/her smartphone to enter information about personal food
preferences that he/she wants to match. When a client enters
the supermarket he/she uses the provided mobile application
to connect to the supermarket wireless gateway. Then, each
time the shopper takes an item from the shelf and passes it
through the embedded RFID reader device, the latter reads the
item tag and passes its information to the mobile application
of the shopper. Once the application handles a novel arriving
tag information, it sends it to the back-end server with a profile
matching request. The shopper’s smartphone and the back-end
server start running a profile matching process using our novel
private set intersection protocol (Π-FAC). This application
ends-up by showing the shopper which profiles match the
taken item among the set of profiles that he/she entered.
B. FAC Architecture
To implement the FAC application, we propose the follow-
ing architecture model that is based on three layers, namely
RFID system, communication, and application (Figure 1).
• RFID system. This is the basic layer. It consists of
an RFID system with standard components. It involves
passive tags put on each item of the supermarket, reader
devices that can be either fixed on the shelves or embed-
ded on shopping carts, and an RFID middleware. This
latter component is not required by our FAC application,
it aims to recover each tag read by a device to enable
the integration of other application using the same RFID
infrastructure.
• Communication layer. It involves a wireless commu-
nication gateway that covers the supermarket surface.
It aims to interconnect the upper-layer components and
ensures the communication with the RFID reader devices
and the middleware.
• Application layer. It involves the FAC application set up
on the clients’ smartphones and the back-end server of
the supermarket. The mobile application allows the user
to input its personal preferences and connect to the back-
end to run the private profile matching process using our
built-in private set intersection protocol (Π-FAC).
IV. A NOVEL PRIVATE AND EFFICIENT SET
INTERSECTION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our novel private set intersection
protocol as well as its design model.
A. Our Methodology
In this work, we use a matrix-based approach in which we
represent the private sets of profiles as row matrices (each
matrix corresponds to a private set of profiles and each row
within it corresponds to a profile in the set). Then, each
party obfuscates its matrix by performing a multiplication
with a random matrix chosen independently from the input
domain. Next, each party sends its resultant matrix to the
other party to be multiplied by the other random matrix. Since,
matrix product is not commutative, which is required for the
correctness of the scheme, the two parties will interchange
the side of the matrix product (left multiplication and right
multiplication). At the end, the two resulting matrices will
be checked for rows equality as each row corresponds to an
original element in the set. In what follows, we give a detailed
implementation of the Π-FAC protocol.
B. Protocol Design
To introduce our novel private set intersection protocol
(Π-FAC), we consider a client denoted C and a back-end
server denoted V having respectively X = {x1, ..., xc} and
Y = {y1, ..., yv} sets of profiles and want to securely get the
intersection between their sets. Assume for 1 ≤ i ≤ c and
1 ≤ j ≤ v: xi and yj ∈ Rn. Let M(m,n) denote the set of
all m-by-n matrices and ⊗ denote the matrix multiplication
operator. Let M1 and M2 denote random invertible matrices
used by C and V respectively to obfuscate their sets, where
M1 ∈ M(c, c) and M2 ∈ M(n, n). Let MX and ∪i>1MYi
denote the private sets X and Y respectively, represented as
row matrices, where MX ∈M(c, n) and MYi ∈M(c, n). We
present the detail of Π-FAC protocol in Algorithm 1.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we give a security proof of our protocol
using the Real/Ideal security model [5].
A. Security Model
Let Π denote a multi-party protocol executed by m par-
ticipants (P1,...,Pm) in order to evaluate a function f . Let B
denote the class of adversary that may corrupt participants in
Π. Let R and D denote respectively the real and the ideal
executions of Π on the set of inputs w and the set of security
parameters sec.
Notation 1. Let viewΠE(w,sec)i denote the set of messages
received by the party Pi∈{1,...,m} along with its inputs and
outputs during the execution E of Π on the set of inputs w
and security parameters sec.
Notation 2. Let outΠE(w,sec)i denote the output of the party
Pi∈{1,...,m} by the execution E of the protocol Π on the set of
inputs w and security parameters sec. Let outΠE(v,sec) denote
Algorithm 1: Π-FAC, a Private and Efficient Set Intersec-
tion Protocol
Input : X = {x1, ..., xc} C’s set of personal profiles
Y = {y1, ..., yv} V ’s set of all item profiles
Output: (For C only) Ψ(X,Y ): the private set
intersection between X and Y
Require: (c, n) ∈ N2: 0 < c < n
Step 1 by C
1: Generates a random invertible M1 ∈M(c, c)
2: Creates MX ∈M(c, n) with X’s elements as rows
3: Computes M1X = M1 ⊗ MX
4: Sends M1X to V
Step 2 by V
5: Generates a random invertible M2 ∈M(n, n)
6: Computes M1X2 = M1X ⊗ M2
7: for (i = 1; i < (v/c) + 1; i+ +) do
8: Creates MYi ∈M(c, n) with Y ’s elements as
rows
9: Computes MY2i = MYi ⊗ M2
10: end for
11: Sends M1X2 and ∪i>1MY2i to C
Step 3 by C
12: Computes M1Y2i = M1 ⊗ MY2i, for each
received MY2i
13: For each (m, n, i) if M1X2[m,*] = M1Y2i[n,*]
and M1X2[m,*] 6∈ Ψ(X,Y ) then puts M1X2[m,*]
in Ψ(X,Y )
the global output of all collaborating parties from the same
execution of Π, where
outΠE(w, sec) = ∪mi=1outΠE(w, sec)i
During a real execution (R) we consider the presence of
an adversary denoted A that behaves according to the class B
while corrupting a set of participants Pi(1≤i≤m). At the end
of R, uncorrupted parties output whatever was specified in Π
and the corrupted Pi outputs any random functions of their
viewΠR(w,sec)i.
During an ideal execution (D) we consider the presence
of a trusted incorruptible party denoted T , which receives
the set of inputs w from all participants in order to evaluate
the function f in the presence of an adversary denoted S.
We assume S corrupts the same Pi as the correspondent
adversary A of real execution, and behaves according to the
same class B before sending inputs to T . By the end of D,
uncorrupted participants output what was received from T
and the corrupted Pi output any random functions of their
viewΠD(w,sec)i.
Definition 1. Let Π and f be as above. We consider Π a
secure multi-party protocol if for any real adversary A having
a class B and attacks the protocol Π during its execution on
the set of inputs w and the set of security parameters sec,
there exists an adversary S in the ideal execution having the
same class B and that can emulate any effect achieved by
A. Let
d≡ denote the distribution equality. We formalize the
definition of a secure multi-party protocol Π as follows
{outΠR(w, sec)}
d≡ {outΠD(w, sec)} (1)
B. Security Proof
In what follows, we give security simulations of Π-FAC
protocol using Real/Ideal paradigm. The allowed behavioural
class of adversary is the mixed one, where the client (C)
having a set of inputs X is actively corrupted and the server
(V ) having the set of inputs Y is passively corrupted.
Let A, S and T denote respectively a real adversary, an ideal
adversary and a trusted third party, where A and S have the
same class. Let Π denote the Π-FAC protocol (Algorithm 1),
sec denote security parameters that will be presented below
(Theorem 1), w denote the set of inputs {MX, ∪i>1MYi},
which are the matrix representation of the sets X and Y
respectively, and Ψ(X,Y ) denote the private set intersection
between X and Y .
Theorem 1. Given a set of security conditions (sec) defined as
sec = {(n, c) ∈ N2 : 0 < c < n}. Under these conditions, the
protocol Π-FAC defined in Algorithm 1 is a secure multi-party
protocol against an active corruption of C.
Proof: Assume C is actively corrupted by A. Then, it
can only inject fake inputs (MA) since aborting the protocol
untimely will have no meaning. Assume C sends a fake MA.
In this case, S can emulate A by just handling the fake MA and
sends it to T , which performs the required computation and
sends back Ψ(X,Y ) to C. Thereby, completing the simulation.
At the end, the views of C in Ideal and Real executions are
as follows
viewΠD(w, sec)C = {MX,Ψ(X,Y )} (2)
viewΠR(w, sec)C = {MX,M1X2,∪i>1MY2i,Ψ(X,Y )} (3)
Otherwise, M1X2 = M1X ⊗ M2, where M1X ∈M(c, n) and
M2 ∈ M(n, n). According to security parameters (sec), we
have c < n. This preserves well the privacy of M2. Thereby,
M1X2 that contains (c × n) equations opposite to (n × n)
unknowns for C, will not involve meaningful information for
it and can be reduced from its view. Likewise, ∪i>1MY2i =
∪i>1MYi ⊗ M2, where MYi ∈M(c, n) and M2 ∈M(n, n).
Then, ∪i>1MY2i will contain α(c× n) equations opposite to
(α(c×n)+(n×n)) unknowns for C, where 0 < α < (v/c)+1.
This, does not involve meaningful information for it and can
be so, reduced from its view. After these reductions, the view
of C in real execution will be defined as follows
viewΠR(w, sec)C = {MX,Ψ(X,Y )} (4)
Thus, relying on (2) and (4) we get
{outΠR(w, sec)C}
d≡ {outΠD(w, sec)C} (5)
On the other hand, the uncorrupted V can not be affected by
the corruption of C since V does not require any output in real
execution. Thus, T will simply not send it any output during
ideal execution. This, means that
{outΠR(w, sec)V }
d≡ {outΠD(w, sec)V } (6)
Through (5) and (6), we proved by simulation that all effects
achieved by a real active adversary corrupting C can also be
achieved in an ideal execution. Then, Π-FAC is a secure multi-
party protocol against active corruption of C (Definition 1).
Theorem 2. Given a set of security conditions (sec) defined as
sec = {(n, c) ∈ N2 : 0 < c < n}. Under these conditions, the
protocol Π-FAC defined in Algorithm 1 is a secure multi-party
protocol against a passive corruption of V .
Proof: Assume V is passively corrupted. In this case,
V should follow the specification of the protocol Π-FAC,
yet, it is allowed to analyse all data gathered during the
execution. Then, S will just handle V ’s input and sends it to T ,
which performs the required computation and sends Ψ(X,Y )
to C while sending nothing to V . Thereby, completing the
simulation. At the end, the views of V in Ideal and Real
executions are as follows
viewΠD(w, sec)V = {∪i>1MYi} (7)
viewΠR(w, sec)V = {∪i>1MYi,M1X} (8)
Moreover, M1X = M1 ⊗ MX, where, M1 ∈ M(c, c) and
MX ∈ M(c, n). Then, since we defined (0 < c) as security
parameter (sec), we get (c×n)<((c×n)+(c× c)). Thus, M1X
that contains (c × n) opposite to ((c × n)+(c × c)) unknowns
for V will not involve meaningful information for it and can
be, so, reduced from its view. After reduction, we obtain
viewΠR(w, sec)V = {∪i>1MYi} (9)
Thus, relying on (7) and (9) we get
{outΠR(w, sec)V }
d≡ {outΠD(w, sec)V } (10)
On the other hand, the uncorrupted C outputs what was re-
ceived from T in ideal execution, which is Ψ(X,Y ) according
to the simulation given above and outputs what was specified
in the protocol Π-FAC in real execution, which is Ψ(X,Y )
(Algorithm 1, Output section) . Then, we have
{outΠR(w, sec)C}
d≡ {outΠD(w, sec)C} (11)
Through (10) and (11) we proved by simulation that all effects
achieved by a real passive adversary corrupting V can also be
achieved in an ideal execution. Then, Π-FAC is a secure multi-
party protocol against passive corruption of V (Definition 1).
Corollary 1. Given a set of security conditions (sec) defined
as sec = {(n, k) ∈ N2 : 0 < k < n}. Under these conditions,
the protocol Π-FAC defined in Algorithm 1 is a secure multi-
party protocol in the mixed model of adversary, where C is
actively corrupted and V is passively corrupted.
Proof: Corollary 1 relies heavily on the Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 proved above, while considering separately the case
when the client (C) is corrupted and the case when the server
(V ) is corrupted. We assume that if both parties are corrupted
we are not required to provide security guarantees.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we simulate the performance of our protocol
(Π-FAC) using a queueing theory model. We make experi-
ments on the same data sets with a custom simulator built in
Python and an Intel i5-2557M CPU running at 1.70 GHz and
having a 4 GB of RAM.
1) Experimental scenario: We consider a large-scale su-
permarket that wants to provide their clients with a Food
Adequacy Check (FAC) service using our private set inter-
section protocol (Π-FAC). In order to assess the scalability of
Π-FAC, we consider the back-end server (V ) receiving (N )
FAC requests from different clients (C) at rate (λ) request(s)
per minute according to a Poisson process: N ∼ P (λ).
Assume the requests processing times (ti) have an exponential
distribution with rate (µ) requests per minute ti ∼ exp(µ).
Without loss of generality, we consider fixing the number of
client personal profiles to 10 profiles per client, where each
profile involves 20 attributes (∈ R20). Besides, we consider
V having 1000 profiles of 20 attributes per item. This, results
in an average range of 50 possible values for each attribute,
which is highly sufficient in real applications.
For comparison purpose, we model the same above scenario,
while V uses the hash-based private set intersection protocol
used in practice (Section IV-A) instead of our Π-FAC protocol.
For this, we use an efficient commutative hash function
Hk(x) = x
k mod p, where k is a 32-bit security parameter
and p is a 32-bit random prime.
Assume V having a FIFO service discipline with unlim-
ited access, and operating all day long. Let M/M/1 denote
this system using Kendall’s notation [23]. We evaluate this
system by varying the the number of clients requesting for
FAC service (λ) in the range {10, 20, 50, 100, 200} clients
(requests) per minute. Let mult, add, exp and mod denote
respectively one multiplication, one addition, one exponen-
tiation and one modulo operations. Let v and c denote the
number of profiles of V and C respectively, where each profile
involves n attributes. To measure µ parameter, we evaluate the
computational costs required by V when using Π-FAC and the
hashing scheme by the following equations.
Cost
(Π−FAC)
V = n
2(v + c) mult + n(n− 1)(v + c) add
Cost
(hash)
V = n(v + c) exp+ n(v + c) mod
2) Results & discussion: We have made experimental eval-
uations by simulating two back-end servers of a supermarket
handling FAC requests, while one was running Π-FAC pro-
tocol and the other was running a hash-based protocol. We
used the model described in Table 1 and we evaluated the
system performance for each protocol according to the number
of requests (λ) through the following metrics: the usability
rate (U ) of the back-end server, its response time (R), the
average number of clients (N ) in the system, and the mean
length of waiting queue (Q). Let ρ denote the intensity traffic
rate. We assess the previous metrics according to the following
equations and we present the results in Table 1 and Figure 4.
ρ =
λ
µ
U = ρ N =
ρ
1− ρ
Q = N − ρ R = N
λ
For low arrival rates (λ < 100) results show that the
server running Π-FAC was undergoing a slow intensity traffic
(ρ < 0.1), which results in a very low probability of server
overload. This claim may be confirmed by looking the low
server utilization rate (U < 10%), besides, the zero queue
length (Q = 0). On the hand, the server running the hash
protocol was less efficient with a usability rate of U > 70%
for 50 clients per minute. This high usability tends to overload
the server if more clients arrive (λ > 50), which may be
confirmed by looking the increase in the number of clients
waiting in the queue (Q > 0). Regarding response time, Π-
FAC provided a high efficient and stable response (R = 2.x
ms) compared to the hash protocol, which was less efficient
and had a significant delay each time there was an increase in
the arrival rate.
For high arrival rates (λ > 100), the server running Π-FAC
remained efficient with a usability rate of U < 50% for 200
clients per minute while providing a high efficient response
time (R < 4 ms). In contrast, the server running the hash
protocol was undergoing a very high intensity traffic (ρ > 1),
which leads the system to a non-steady state and results in
overloading the server with a utilization rate of U > 100%.
This, tended to an infinite queue length (Q = ∞) and an
infinite response time (R =∞).
Experimental results revealed the efficiency of our Π-FAC
protocol compared to the hash-based solution used in practice.
This efficiency raises from the fact that our protocol involves
efficient arithmetic operations (addition and multiplication)
and does not require any expensive computations (modulo,
exponentiation), which are involved in cryptographic methods.
These performance results show the adequacy of our protocol
to be used by large scale supermarkets.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we expanded a novel RFID-based application
that aims to check whether food items matches the preferences
of the shoppers, according to their personal profiles. For
this, we proposed Π-FAC, a novel set intersection protocol
that targets privacy and efficiency concerns while matching
shoppers’ preferences with item profiles that are held by the
back-end server of the store. Through security analysis con-
ducted with the standard Real/Ideal paradigm, we showed the
privacy guarantees provided by Π-FAC against curious stores
and malicious clients. Besides, across empirical performance
analysis, we demonstrated the high efficiency of our protocol
compared to the hash-based private set intersection used in
practice. Evaluation results revealed the adequacy of Π-FAC to
provide a private and efficient Food Adequacy Check service
for large-scale stores.
Table I
EVALUATION OF A BACK-EN SERVER STORE USING M/M/1 MODEL
Fixed
Parameters
Used
Protocol
Client
Requests
(λ)/min
Running
Time
s
Processing
Rate
(µ)
Intensity
Traffic
(ρ)
Usability
Rate
(U) %
Number of
Client
(N) × 102
Queue
Length
(Q)
Response
Time
(R) ms
v= 1000
c= 10
n= 20
Π-FAC
10 1.29
470
0.02 2 2 0 2
20 2.54 0.04 4 4 0 2
50 6.30 0.10 10 11 0 2.2
100 12.79 0.21 21 26 0 2.6
200 25.53 0.42 42 72 0 3.6
Hash
10 8.59
70
0.14 14 16 0 16
20 17.28 0.28 28 39 0 19.5
50 42.80 0.71 71 245 2 49
100 86.53 1.43 143 ∞ ∞ ∞
200 171.66 2.86 286 ∞ ∞ ∞
(a) Usability Rate (U) (b) Queue length (Q) (c) Response time (R)
Figure 2. Evaluation of a back-en server store using M/M/1 model
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